JBNST - Vol. 240/1 - 2020

We conducted bribery experiments in China and in Germany to analyze the effect of staff rotation on corruption. After being bribed, Chinese and German subjects in the role of public officials less often reciprocated and instead behaved more often opportunistically when matched to strangers compared to partners. Thus, staff rotation reduced the public officials´ propensity to behave corruptly in our experiment. German subjects in the role of firms anticipated this behavior: In stranger matching, their frequency of bribe-giving was lower than in partner matching, and if they bribed, the bribe value was significantly lower when staff rotation was introduced. For Chinese subjects in the role of firms, this effect of our anti-corruption policy was not significant. We discuss the role of social norms, such as reciprocity and trust, to explain our results.

Motivated by the canonical (random) on-the-job search model, I measure a person’s ability to sort into higher ranked jobs by the risk ratio of job-to-job transitions to transitions into unemployment. I show that this measure possesses various desirable features. Making use of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), I study the relation between human capital and the risk ratio of job-to-job transitions to transitions into unemployment. Formal education tends to be positively associated with this risk ratio. General experience and occupational tenure have a pronounced negative correlation with both job-to-job transitions and transitions into unemployment, leaving the risk ratio, however, mostly unaffected. In contrast, the estimates suggest that human-capital concepts that take into account the multidimensionality of skills, e.g. versatility, play a prominent role.

The European Commission actively evaluates occupational entry restrictions in all member states. This has attracted a growing interest among scholars of the German crafts sector as it is governed by an idiosyncratic national set of rules. We estimate the effects of the deregulation of the German Trade and Crafts Code in 2004 on the overall vocational training levels in affected crafts trades. We employ Difference-in-Differences regressions as well as Synthetic Control Methods on data for the entire population of the German crafts sector. We provide evidence that the overall effect of the reform on vocational training levels was negative. While we cannot comprehensively rule out all potential confounding factors, we address competing explanations related to demand shocks, recession effect, and migration. In addition, there is evidence that the overall deregulation effects can be decomposed into a sunk-cost-channel and a firm size channel.

This paper examines the influence of the level of unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosengeld II) on the wage level by exploiting a quasi-natural experiment formed by the German Hartz reforms in 2005. Estimations are based on data from the Socioeconomic Panel ranging from 2000 to 2007. As dependent variables both real monthly gross salary and real hourly gross wage are used. Firstly, following the approach taken by Arent and Nagl (2013, Unemployment Compensation and Wages: Evidence from the German Hartz Reforms. Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 233 (4): 450–466), a before-after estimator is applied. Secondly, in contrast to the replication study by Ludsteck and Seth (2014, Comment on „Unemployment Compensation and Wages: Evidence from the German Hartz Reforms“ by Stefan Arent and Wolfgang Nagl. Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 234 (5): 635–644) a control group is constructed and a difference-in-differences estimator (DiD) is used for further assessment. The results of the before-after estimation indicate a negative influence of the unemployment assistance reform on wages. However, the corresponding placebo regressions cast doubt on whether the estimated effect is a policy effect. The DiD approach shows that substantial time effects exist. This indicates that the before-after estimator is not suitable for assessing the policy effect. Applying the DiD estimator, a negative significant policy effect is only identified for men in West Germany.